release: 2023.8.7

security: fix CVE-2024-23647 (#8345)

* security: fix CVE-2024-23647



* add tests



* add website



---------

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>
Co-authored-by: Jens L <jens@goauthentik.io>

.bumpversion.cfg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 [bumpversion]
-current_version = 2023.8.3
+current_version = 2023.8.7
 tag = True
 commit = True
 parse = (?P<major>\d+)\.(?P<minor>\d+)\.(?P<patch>\d+)

.github/workflows/ci-main.yml

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 env:
   POSTGRES_DB: authentik
@@ -184,6 +185,9 @@ jobs:
   build:
     needs: ci-core-mark
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     timeout-minutes: 120
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
@@ -229,6 +233,9 @@ jobs:
   build-arm64:
     needs: ci-core-mark
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     timeout-minutes: 120
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3

.github/workflows/ci-outpost.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 jobs:
   lint-golint:
@@ -63,6 +64,9 @@ jobs:
           - ldap
           - radius
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
         with:

.github/workflows/ci-web.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 jobs:
   lint-eslint:

.github/workflows/ci-website.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 jobs:
   lint-prettier:

.github/workflows/release-next-branch.yml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ on:
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
+  # Needed to be able to push to the next branch
   contents: write
 
 jobs:

.github/workflows/release-publish.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ on:
 jobs:
   build-server:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
       - name: Set up QEMU
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ jobs:
             VERSION_FAMILY=${{ steps.ev.outputs.versionFamily }}
   build-outpost:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:
@@ -96,6 +102,9 @@ jobs:
   build-outpost-binary:
     timeout-minutes: 120
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload binaries to the release
+      contents: write
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:

.github/workflows/repo-stale.yml

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ on:
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
+  # Needed to update issues and PRs
   issues: write
-  pull-requests: write
 
 jobs:
   stale:

authentik/__init__.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 from os import environ
 from typing import Optional
 
-__version__ = "2023.8.3"
+__version__ = "2023.8.7"
 ENV_GIT_HASH_KEY = "GIT_BUILD_HASH"
 
 

authentik/flows/migrations/0026_alter_flow_options.py

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Generated by Django 4.2.6 on 2023-10-10 17:18
+
+from django.db import migrations
+
+
+class Migration(migrations.Migration):
+    dependencies = [
+        ("authentik_flows", "0025_alter_flowstagebinding_evaluate_on_plan_and_more"),
+    ]
+
+    operations = [
+        migrations.AlterModelOptions(
+            name="flow",
+            options={
+                "permissions": [
+                    ("export_flow", "Can export a Flow"),
+                    ("inspect_flow", "Can inspect a Flow's execution"),
+                    ("view_flow_cache", "View Flow's cache metrics"),
+                    ("clear_flow_cache", "Clear Flow's cache metrics"),
+                ],
+                "verbose_name": "Flow",
+                "verbose_name_plural": "Flows",
+            },
+        ),
+    ]

authentik/flows/migrations/0027_auto_20231028_1424.py

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Generated by Django 4.2.6 on 2023-10-28 14:24
+
+from django.apps.registry import Apps
+from django.db import migrations
+from django.db.backends.base.schema import BaseDatabaseSchemaEditor
+
+
+def set_oobe_flow_authentication(apps: Apps, schema_editor: BaseDatabaseSchemaEditor):
+    from guardian.shortcuts import get_anonymous_user
+
+    Flow = apps.get_model("authentik_flows", "Flow")
+    User = apps.get_model("authentik_core", "User")
+
+    db_alias = schema_editor.connection.alias
+
+    users = User.objects.using(db_alias).exclude(username="akadmin")
+    try:
+        users = users.exclude(pk=get_anonymous_user().pk)
+    # pylint: disable=broad-except
+    except Exception:  # nosec
+        pass
+
+    if users.exists():
+        Flow.objects.filter(slug="initial-setup").update(authentication="require_superuser")
+
+
+class Migration(migrations.Migration):
+    dependencies = [
+        ("authentik_flows", "0026_alter_flow_options"),
+    ]
+
+    operations = [
+        migrations.RunPython(set_oobe_flow_authentication),
+    ]

authentik/providers/oauth2/tests/test_authorize.py

@@ -85,6 +85,25 @@ class TestAuthorize(OAuthTestCase):
             )
             OAuthAuthorizationParams.from_request(request)
 
+    def test_blocked_redirect_uri(self):
+        """test missing/invalid redirect URI"""
+        OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=create_test_flow(),
+            redirect_uris="data:local.invalid",
+        )
+        with self.assertRaises(RedirectUriError):
+            request = self.factory.get(
+                "/",
+                data={
+                    "response_type": "code",
+                    "client_id": "test",
+                    "redirect_uri": "data:localhost",
+                },
+            )
+            OAuthAuthorizationParams.from_request(request)
+
     def test_invalid_redirect_uri_empty(self):
         """test missing/invalid redirect URI"""
         provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(

authentik/providers/oauth2/tests/test_token_pkce.py

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+"""Test token view"""
+from base64 import b64encode, urlsafe_b64encode
+from hashlib import sha256
+
+from django.test import RequestFactory
+from django.urls import reverse
+
+from authentik.core.models import Application
+from authentik.core.tests.utils import create_test_admin_user, create_test_flow
+from authentik.flows.challenge import ChallengeTypes
+from authentik.lib.generators import generate_id
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.constants import GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.models import AuthorizationCode, OAuth2Provider
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.tests.utils import OAuthTestCase
+
+
+class TestTokenPKCE(OAuthTestCase):
+    """Test token view"""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        super().setUp()
+        self.factory = RequestFactory()
+        self.app = Application.objects.create(name=generate_id(), slug="test")
+
+    def test_pkce_missing_in_authorize(self):
+        """Test PKCE with code_challenge in authorize request
+        and missing verifier in token request"""
+        flow = create_test_flow()
+        provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=flow,
+            redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
+            access_code_validity="seconds=100",
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
+        state = generate_id()
+        user = create_test_admin_user()
+        self.client.force_login(user)
+        challenge = generate_id()
+        header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
+        # Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
+        self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
+            data={
+                "response_type": "code",
+                "client_id": "test",
+                "state": state,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+                "code_challenge": challenge,
+                "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
+        )
+        code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content.decode(),
+            {
+                "component": "xak-flow-redirect",
+                "type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
+                "to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.post(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
+            data={
+                "grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
+                "code": code.code,
+                # Missing the code_verifier here
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+            },
+            HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
+        )
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content,
+            {
+                "error": "invalid_grant",
+                "error_description": (
+                    "The provided authorization grant or refresh token is invalid, expired, "
+                    "revoked, does not match the redirection URI used in the authorization "
+                    "request, or was issued to another client"
+                ),
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
+
+    def test_pkce_missing_in_token(self):
+        """Test PKCE with missing code_challenge in authorization request but verifier
+        set in token request"""
+        flow = create_test_flow()
+        provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=flow,
+            redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
+            access_code_validity="seconds=100",
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
+        state = generate_id()
+        user = create_test_admin_user()
+        self.client.force_login(user)
+        header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
+        # Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
+        self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
+            data={
+                "response_type": "code",
+                "client_id": "test",
+                "state": state,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+                # "code_challenge": challenge,
+                # "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
+        )
+        code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content.decode(),
+            {
+                "component": "xak-flow-redirect",
+                "type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
+                "to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.post(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
+            data={
+                "grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
+                "code": code.code,
+                "code_verifier": generate_id(),
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+            },
+            HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
+        )
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content,
+            {
+                "error": "invalid_grant",
+                "error_description": (
+                    "The provided authorization grant or refresh token is invalid, expired, "
+                    "revoked, does not match the redirection URI used in the authorization "
+                    "request, or was issued to another client"
+                ),
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
+
+    def test_pkce_correct_s256(self):
+        """Test full with pkce"""
+        flow = create_test_flow()
+        provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=flow,
+            redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
+            access_code_validity="seconds=100",
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
+        state = generate_id()
+        user = create_test_admin_user()
+        self.client.force_login(user)
+        verifier = generate_id()
+        challenge = (
+            urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest())
+            .decode("utf-8")
+            .replace("=", "")
+        )
+        header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
+        # Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
+        self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
+            data={
+                "response_type": "code",
+                "client_id": "test",
+                "state": state,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+                "code_challenge": challenge,
+                "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
+        )
+        code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content.decode(),
+            {
+                "component": "xak-flow-redirect",
+                "type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
+                "to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.post(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
+            data={
+                "grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
+                "code": code.code,
+                "code_verifier": verifier,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+            },
+            HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+
+    def test_pkce_correct_plain(self):
+        """Test full with pkce"""
+        flow = create_test_flow()
+        provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=flow,
+            redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
+            access_code_validity="seconds=100",
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
+        state = generate_id()
+        user = create_test_admin_user()
+        self.client.force_login(user)
+        verifier = generate_id()
+        header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
+        # Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
+        self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
+            data={
+                "response_type": "code",
+                "client_id": "test",
+                "state": state,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+                "code_challenge": verifier,
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
+        )
+        code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content.decode(),
+            {
+                "component": "xak-flow-redirect",
+                "type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
+                "to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.post(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
+            data={
+                "grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
+                "code": code.code,
+                "code_verifier": verifier,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+            },
+            HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)

authentik/providers/oauth2/views/authorize.py

@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ PLAN_CONTEXT_PARAMS = "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/params"
 SESSION_KEY_LAST_LOGIN_UID = "authentik/providers/oauth2/last_login_uid"
 
 ALLOWED_PROMPT_PARAMS = {PROMPT_NONE, PROMPT_CONSENT, PROMPT_LOGIN}
+FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES = {"javascript", "data", "vbscript"}
 
 
 @dataclass(slots=True)
@@ -174,6 +175,10 @@ class OAuthAuthorizationParams:
         self.check_scope()
         self.check_nonce()
         self.check_code_challenge()
+        if self.request:
+            raise AuthorizeError(
+                self.redirect_uri, "request_not_supported", self.grant_type, self.state
+            )
 
     def check_redirect_uri(self):
         """Redirect URI validation."""
@@ -211,10 +216,9 @@ class OAuthAuthorizationParams:
                     expected=allowed_redirect_urls,
                 )
                 raise RedirectUriError(self.redirect_uri, allowed_redirect_urls)
-        if self.request:
-            raise AuthorizeError(
-                self.redirect_uri, "request_not_supported", self.grant_type, self.state
-            )
+        # Check against forbidden schemes
+        if urlparse(self.redirect_uri).scheme in FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES:
+            raise RedirectUriError(self.redirect_uri, allowed_redirect_urls)
 
     def check_scope(self):
         """Ensure openid scope is set in Hybrid flows, or when requesting an id_token"""

authentik/providers/oauth2/views/token.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from hashlib import sha256
 from re import error as RegexError
 from re import fullmatch
 from typing import Any, Optional
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 from django.http import HttpRequest, HttpResponse
 from django.utils import timezone
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ from authentik.providers.oauth2.models import (
     RefreshToken,
 )
 from authentik.providers.oauth2.utils import TokenResponse, cors_allow, extract_client_auth
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.views.authorize import FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES
 from authentik.sources.oauth.models import OAuthSource
 from authentik.stages.password.stage import PLAN_CONTEXT_METHOD, PLAN_CONTEXT_METHOD_ARGS
 
@@ -204,6 +206,10 @@ class TokenParams:
                 ).from_http(request)
                 raise TokenError("invalid_client")
 
+        # Check against forbidden schemes
+        if urlparse(self.redirect_uri).scheme in FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES:
+            raise TokenError("invalid_request")
+
         self.authorization_code = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(code=raw_code).first()
         if not self.authorization_code:
             LOGGER.warning("Code does not exist", code=raw_code)
@@ -221,7 +227,10 @@ class TokenParams:
             raise TokenError("invalid_grant")
 
         # Validate PKCE parameters.
-        if self.code_verifier:
+        if self.authorization_code.code_challenge:
+            # Authorization code had PKCE but we didn't get one
+            if not self.code_verifier:
+                raise TokenError("invalid_grant")
             if self.authorization_code.code_challenge_method == PKCE_METHOD_S256:
                 new_code_challenge = (
                     urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(self.code_verifier.encode("ascii")).digest())
@@ -234,6 +243,10 @@ class TokenParams:
             if new_code_challenge != self.authorization_code.code_challenge:
                 LOGGER.warning("Code challenge not matching")
                 raise TokenError("invalid_grant")
+        # Token request had a code_verifier but code did not have a code challenge
+        # Prevent downgrade
+        if not self.authorization_code.code_challenge and self.code_verifier:
+            raise TokenError("invalid_grant")
 
     def __post_init_refresh(self, raw_token: str, request: HttpRequest):
         if not raw_token:

authentik/providers/saml/processors/metadata.py

@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ class MetadataProcessor:
             entity_descriptor, f"{{{NS_SAML_METADATA}}}IDPSSODescriptor"
         )
         idp_sso_descriptor.attrib["protocolSupportEnumeration"] = NS_SAML_PROTOCOL
+        if self.provider.verification_kp:
+            idp_sso_descriptor.attrib["WantAuthnRequestsSigned"] = "true"
 
         signing_descriptor = self.get_signing_key_descriptor()
         if signing_descriptor is not None:

authentik/providers/saml/tests/test_metadata.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from authentik.lib.xml import lxml_from_string
 from authentik.providers.saml.models import SAMLBindings, SAMLPropertyMapping, SAMLProvider
 from authentik.providers.saml.processors.metadata import MetadataProcessor
 from authentik.providers.saml.processors.metadata_parser import ServiceProviderMetadataParser
-from authentik.sources.saml.processors.constants import NS_MAP
+from authentik.sources.saml.processors.constants import NS_MAP, NS_SAML_METADATA
 
 
 class TestServiceProviderMetadataParser(TestCase):
@@ -55,6 +55,24 @@ class TestServiceProviderMetadataParser(TestCase):
         schema = etree.XMLSchema(etree.parse("schemas/saml-schema-metadata-2.0.xsd"))  # nosec
         self.assertTrue(schema.validate(metadata))
 
+    def test_schema_want_authn_requests_signed(self):
+        """Test metadata generation with WantAuthnRequestsSigned"""
+        cert = create_test_cert()
+        provider = SAMLProvider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            authorization_flow=self.flow,
+            verification_kp=cert,
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            slug=generate_id(),
+            provider=provider,
+        )
+        request = self.factory.get("/")
+        metadata = lxml_from_string(MetadataProcessor(provider, request).build_entity_descriptor())
+        idp_sso_descriptor = metadata.findall(f"{{{NS_SAML_METADATA}}}IDPSSODescriptor")[0]
+        self.assertEqual(idp_sso_descriptor.attrib["WantAuthnRequestsSigned"], "true")
+
     def test_simple(self):
         """Test simple metadata without Signing"""
         metadata = ServiceProviderMetadataParser().parse(load_fixture("fixtures/simple.xml"))

authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/freeipa.py

@@ -47,9 +47,11 @@ class FreeIPA(BaseLDAPSynchronizer):
             return
         # For some reason, nsaccountlock is not defined properly in the schema as bool
         # hence we get it as a list of strings
-        _is_active = str(self._flatten(attributes.get("nsaccountlock", ["FALSE"])))
+        _is_locked = str(self._flatten(attributes.get("nsaccountlock", ["FALSE"])))
         # So we have to attempt to convert it to a bool
-        is_active = _is_active.lower() == "true"
+        is_locked = _is_locked.lower() == "true"
+        # And then invert it since freeipa saves locked and we save active
+        is_active = not is_locked
         if is_active != user.is_active:
             user.is_active = is_active
             user.save()

authentik/sources/ldap/tests/test_sync.py

@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ class LDAPSyncTests(TestCase):
             user_sync.sync_full()
             self.assertTrue(User.objects.filter(username="user0_sn").exists())
             self.assertFalse(User.objects.filter(username="user1_sn").exists())
+            self.assertFalse(User.objects.get(username="user-nsaccountlock").is_active)
 
     def test_sync_groups_ad(self):
         """Test group sync"""

blueprints/default/flow-oobe.yaml

@@ -85,6 +85,19 @@ entries:
   identifiers:
     name: default-oobe-password-usable
   model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
+- attrs:
+    expression: |
+      # This policy ensures that the setup flow can only be
+      # used one time
+      from authentik.flows.models import Flow, FlowAuthenticationRequirement
+      Flow.objects.filter(slug="initial-setup").update(
+          authentication=FlowAuthenticationRequirement.REQUIRE_SUPERUSER,
+      )
+      return True
+  id: policy-default-oobe-flow-set-authentication
+  identifiers:
+    name: default-oobe-flow-set-authentication
+  model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
 - attrs:
     fields:
     - !KeyOf prompt-field-header
@@ -129,6 +142,7 @@ entries:
     evaluate_on_plan: true
     invalid_response_action: retry
     re_evaluate_policies: false
+  id: binding-login
   identifiers:
     order: 100
     stage: !KeyOf stage-default-authentication-login
@@ -144,3 +158,8 @@ entries:
     policy: !KeyOf policy-default-oobe-prefill-user
     target: !KeyOf binding-password-write
   model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+- identifiers:
+    order: 0
+    policy: !KeyOf policy-default-oobe-flow-set-authentication
+    target: !KeyOf binding-login
+  model: authentik_policies.policybinding

blueprints/system/bootstrap.yaml

@@ -42,9 +42,3 @@ entries:
       user: !KeyOf admin-user
     attrs:
       key: !Context token
-  - model: authentik_blueprints.blueprintinstance
-    identifiers:
-      metadata:
-        labels:
-          blueprints.goauthentik.io/system-bootstrap: "true"
-    state: absent

docker-compose.yml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ services:
     volumes:
       - redis:/data
   server:
-    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.3}
+    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.7}
     restart: unless-stopped
     command: server
     environment:
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ services:
       - postgresql
       - redis
   worker:
-    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.3}
+    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.7}
     restart: unless-stopped
     command: worker
     environment:

internal/constants/constants.go

@@ -29,4 +29,4 @@ func UserAgent() string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("authentik@%s", FullVersion())
 }
 
-const VERSION = "2023.8.3"
+const VERSION = "2023.8.7"

pyproject.toml

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ filterwarnings = [
 
 [tool.poetry]
 name = "authentik"
-version = "2023.8.3"
+version = "2023.8.7"
 description = ""
 authors = ["authentik Team <hello@goauthentik.io>"]
 

schema.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 openapi: 3.0.3
 info:
   title: authentik
-  version: 2023.8.3
+  version: 2023.8.7
   description: Making authentication simple.
   contact:
     email: hello@goauthentik.io

web/src/common/constants.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ export const SUCCESS_CLASS = "pf-m-success";
 export const ERROR_CLASS = "pf-m-danger";
 export const PROGRESS_CLASS = "pf-m-in-progress";
 export const CURRENT_CLASS = "pf-m-current";
-export const VERSION = "2023.8.3";
+export const VERSION = "2023.8.7";
 export const TITLE_DEFAULT = "authentik";
 export const ROUTE_SEPARATOR = ";";
 

website/docs/releases/2023/v2023.8.md

@@ -155,6 +155,18 @@ image:
 -   web: don't import entire SourceViewPage in flow and user interface (#6761)
 -   web: replace ampersand (#6737)
 
+## Fixed in 2023.8.4
+
+-   \*: fix [GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w](../security/GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w), Reported by [@devSparkle](https://github.com/devSparkle)
+
+## Fixed in 2023.8.5
+
+-   security: fix [CVE-2023-48228](../../security/CVE-2023-48228.md), Reported by [@Sapd](https://github.com/Sapd) (#7666)
+
+## Fixed in 2023.8.6
+
+-   providers/oauth2: fix [CVE-2024-21637](../../security/CVE-2024-21637.md), Reported by [@lauritzh](https://github.com/lauritzh) (#8104)
+
 ## API Changes
 
 #### What's New

website/docs/security/CVE-2023-48228.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# CVE-2023-48228
+
+_Reported by [@Sapd](https://github.com/Sapd)_
+
+## OAuth2: Insufficient PKCE check
+
+### Summary
+
+When initialising a OAuth2 flow with a `code_challenge` and `code_method` (thus requesting PKCE), the SSO provider (authentik) **must** check if there is a matching **and** existing `code_verifier` during the token step.
+
+authentik checks if the contents of code*verifier is matching \*\*\_ONLY*\*\* when it is provided. When it is left out completely, authentik simply accepts the token request with out it; even when the flow was started with a `code_challenge`.
+
+### Patches
+
+authentik 2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4 fix this issue.
+
+### Details
+
+The `code_verifier` is only checked when the user provides it. Note that in line 209 there is a check if the code_parameter is left out. But there is no check if the PKCE parameter simply was omitted WHEN the request was started with a `code_challenge_method`.
+
+This oversight likely did not stem from a coding error but from a misinterpretation of the RFC, where the backward compatibility section may be somewhat confusing.
+https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636#section-4.5
+RFC7636 explicitly says in Section 4.5:
+
+> The "code_challenge_method" is bound to the Authorization Code when
+> the Authorization Code is issued. That is the method that the token
+> endpoint MUST use to verify the "code_verifier".
+
+Section 5, Compatibility
+
+> Server implementations of this specification MAY accept OAuth2.0
+> clients that do not implement this extension. If the "code_verifier"
+> is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers
+> supporting backwards compatibility revert to the OAuth 2.0 [[RFC6749](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749)]
+> protocol without this extension.
+
+Section 5, Compatibility, allows server implementations of this specification to accept OAuth 2.0 clients that do not implement this extension. However, if a `code_verifier` is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers that support backward compatibility should revert to the standard OAuth 2.0 protocol sans this extension (including all steps).
+
+It should be noted that this does not mean that the `code_verifier` check can be disregarded at any point if the initial request included `code_challenge` or `code_challenge_method`. Since Authentik supports PKCE, it **MUST** verify the code_verifier as described in Section 4.5 **AND** fail if it was not provided.
+
+Ofc verification can be skipped if the original authorization request did not invoke PKCE (no `code_challenge_method` and no `code_challenge`).
+
+Failure to check the `code_verifier` renders the PKCE flow ineffective. This vulnerability particularly endangers public or hybrid clients, as their `code` is deemed non-confidential.
+
+While not explicitly stated in the standard, it is generally recommended that OAuth2 flows accepting public clients should enforce PKCE - at least when redirecting to a non HTTPS URL (like http or an app link).
+
+### Impact
+
+The vulnerability poses a high risk to both public and hybrid clients.
+When for example a mobile app implements oauth2, a malicious app can simply also register the same in-app-link (e.g. `mycoolapp://oauth2`) for the redirect callback URL, possibly receiving `code` during callback. With PKCE working, a malicious app would still receive a `code` but the `code` would not work without the correct unhashed code-challenge.
+This is especially problematic, because authentik claims to support PKCE, and a developer can expect that the proper checks are in place. Note that app-links cannot be protected by HTTPS or similar mechanisms.
+
+Note also that this vulnerability poses a threat to confidential clients. Many confidential clients act as a proxy for OAuth2 API requests, typically from mobile apps or single-page applications. These proxies relay `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method` (in auth request, which most libraries force and provide on default settings) and `code_verifier` in the token request unchanged and supplement the CLIENT_SECRET which only the relay knows. The relay can but does not have to check for an existing `code_verifier` as the standard does not define that PKCE can be ignored on confidential clients during the token request when the client requested PKCE during the authorization request.
+
+An attacker could potentially gain full access to the application. If the code grants access to an admin account, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of that application are compromised.
+
+### For more information
+
+If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
+
+-   Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

website/docs/security/CVE-2024-21637.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# CVE-2024-21637
+
+_Reported by [@lauritzh](https://github.com/lauritzh)_
+
+## XSS in Authentik via JavaScript-URI as Redirect URI and form_post Response Mode
+
+### Summary
+
+Given an OAuth2 provider configured with allowed redirect URIs set to `*` or `.*`, an attacker can send an OAuth Authorization request using `response_mode=form_post` and setting `redirect_uri` to a malicious URI, to capture authentik's session token.
+
+### Patches
+
+authentik 2023.8.6 and 2023.10.6 fix this issue.
+
+### Impact
+
+The impact depends on the attack scenario. In the following I will describe the two scenario that were identified for Authentik.
+
+#### Redirect URI Misconfiguration
+
+While advising that this may cause security issues, Authentik generally allows wildcards as Redirect URI. Therefore, using a wildcard-only effectively allowing arbitrary URLS is possible misconfiguration that may be present in real-world instances.
+
+In such cases, unauthenticated and unprivileged attackers can perform the above described actions.
+
+### User with (only) App Administration Permissions
+
+A more likely scenario is an administrative user (e.g. a normal developer) having only permissions to manage applications.
+
+This relatively user could use the described attacks to perform a privilege escalation.
+
+### Workaround
+
+It is recommended to upgrade to the patched version of authentik. If not possible, ensure that OAuth2 providers do not use a wildcard (`*` or `.*`) value as allowed redirect URI setting. (This is _not_ exploitable if part of the redirect URI has a wildcard, for example `https://foo-.*\.bar\.com`)
+
+### For more information
+
+If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
+
+-   Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

website/docs/security/CVE-2024-23647.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# CVE-2024-23647
+
+_Reported by [@pieterphilippaerts](https://github.com/pieterphilippaerts)_
+
+## PKCE downgrade attack in authentik
+
+## Summary
+
+PKCE is a very important countermeasure in OAuth2 , both for public and confidential clients. It protects against CSRF attacks and code injection attacks. Because of this bug, an attacker can circumvent the protection PKCE offers.
+
+## Patches
+
+authentik 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7 fix this issue.
+
+## Details
+
+There is a bug in our implementation of PKCE that allows an attacker to circumvent the protection that PKCE offers. PKCE adds the `code_challenge’ parameter to the authorization request and adds the `code_verifier’ parameter to the token request. We recently fixed a downgrade attack (in v2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4) where if the attacker removed the `code_verifier’ parameter in the token request, authentik would allow the request to pass, thus circumventing PKCE’s protection. However, in the latest version of the software, another downgrade scenario is still possible: if the attacker removes the `code_challenge’ parameter from the authorization request, authentik will also not do the PKCE check.
+
+Note that this type of downgrade enables an attacker to perform a code injection attack, even if the OAuth client is using PKCE (which is supposed to protect against code injection attacks). To start the attack, the attacker must initiate the authorization process without that `code_challenge’ parameter in the authorization request. But this is easy to do (just use a phishing site or email to trick the user into clicking on a link that the attacker controls – the authorization link without that `code_challenge’ parameter).
+
+The OAuth BCP (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics) explicitly mentions this particular attack in section 2.1.1: “Authorization servers MUST mitigate PKCE Downgrade Attacks by ensuring that a token request containing a code_verifier parameter is accepted only if a code_challenge parameter was present in the authorization request, see Section 4.8.2 for details.”
+
+## For more information
+
+If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
+
+-   Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

website/docs/security/GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w
+
+_Reported by [@devSparkle](https://github.com/devSparkle)_
+
+## Potential Installation takeover when default admin user is deleted
+
+### Summary
+
+In the affected versions, when the default admin user has been deleted, it is potentially possible for an attacker to set the password of the default admin user without any authentication.
+
+### Patches
+
+authentik 2023.8.4 and 2023.10.2 fix this issue, for other versions the workaround can be used.
+
+### Impact
+
+authentik uses a blueprint to create the default admin user, which can also optionally set the default admin users' password from an environment variable. When the user is deleted, the `initial-setup` flow used to configure authentik after the first installation becomes available again.
+
+### Workarounds
+
+Ensure the default admin user (Username `akadmin`) exists and has a password set. It is recommended to use a very strong password for this user, and store it in a secure location like a password manager. It is also possible to deactivate the user to prevent any logins as akadmin.
+
+### For more information
+
+If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
+
+-   Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

website/sidebars.js

@@ -362,6 +362,10 @@ const docsSidebar = {
             },
             items: [
                 "security/policy",
+                "security/CVE-2024-23647",
+                "security/CVE-2024-21637",
+                "security/CVE-2023-48228",
+                "security/GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w",
                 "security/CVE-2023-39522",
                 "security/CVE-2023-36456",
                 "security/2023-06-cure53",