Files
authentik/website/docs/security/cves/CVE-2024-23647.md
Tana M Berry 6d5172d18a website: latest PR for new Docs structure (#11639)
* first pass

* dependency shenanigans

* move blueprints

* few broken links

* change config the throw errors

* internal file edits

* fighting links

* remove sidebarDev

* fix subdomain

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* fix relative URL

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* fix mismatched package versions

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* fix api reference build

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* test tweak

* links hell

* more links hell

* links hell2

* yep last of the links

* last broken link fixed

* re-add cves

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* add devdocs redirects

* add dir

* tweak netlify.toml

* move latest 2 CVES into dir

* fix links to moved cves

* typoed title fix

* fix link

* remove banner

* remove committed api docs

Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>

* integrations: remove version dropdown

Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>

* Update Makefile

Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>

* change doc links in web as well

Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>

* fix some more docs paths

Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>

* fix more docs paths

Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>

* ci: require ci-web.build for merging

Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>

* Revert "ci: require ci-web.build for merging"

This reverts commit b99a4842a9.

* remove sluf for Application

* put slug back in

* minor fix to trigger deploy

* Spelled out Documentation in menu bar

* remove image redirects...

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* remove explicit index.md

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* remove mdx first

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* then remove .md

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* add missing prefix

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>
Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>
Co-authored-by: Tana M Berry <tana@goauthentik.com>
Co-authored-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>
Co-authored-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>
2024-10-09 09:33:40 -05:00

2.2 KiB
Raw Blame History

CVE-2024-23647

Reported by @pieterphilippaerts

PKCE downgrade attack in authentik

Summary

PKCE is a very important countermeasure in OAuth2 , both for public and confidential clients. It protects against CSRF attacks and code injection attacks. Because of this bug, an attacker can circumvent the protection PKCE offers.

Patches

authentik 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7 fix this issue.

Details

There is a bug in our implementation of PKCE that allows an attacker to circumvent the protection that PKCE offers. PKCE adds the code_challenge parameter to the authorization request and adds the code_verifier parameter to the token request. We recently fixed a downgrade attack (in v2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4) where if the attacker removed the code_verifier parameter in the token request, authentik would allow the request to pass, thus circumventing PKCEs protection. However, in the latest version of the software, another downgrade scenario is still possible: if the attacker removes the `code_challenge parameter from the authorization request, authentik will also not do the PKCE check.

Note that this type of downgrade enables an attacker to perform a code injection attack, even if the OAuth client is using PKCE (which is supposed to protect against code injection attacks). To start the attack, the attacker must initiate the authorization process without that code_challenge parameter in the authorization request. But this is easy to do (just use a phishing site or email to trick the user into clicking on a link that the attacker controls the authorization link without that code_challenge parameter).

The OAuth BCP (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics) explicitly mentions this particular attack in section 2.1.1: “Authorization servers MUST mitigate PKCE Downgrade Attacks by ensuring that a token request containing a code_verifier parameter is accepted only if a code_challenge parameter was present in the authorization request, see Section 4.8.2 for details.”

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: